












$EVWUDFW: Several studies indicate that firms are reluctant to cut nominal wages during 
periods of relatively high nominal per capita GDP growth. It has been argued, however, that 
in an environment with a low nominal per capita GDP growth, i.e., when nominal wage cuts 
become customary, firms would no longer hesitate to cut nominal pay. To examine this 
argument we use data from Switzerland where nominal GDP growth has been very low 
between 1991 and 1997. ,W WXUQV RXW WKDW WKH ULJLGLW\ RI QRPLQDO ZDJHV LV D UREXVW
SKHQRPHQRQWKDWGRHVQRWYDQLVKEXWHYHQLQFUHDVHVDVLQIODWLRQGHFUHDVHV1RPLQDOZDJH
ULJLGLW\FRQVWLWXWHVDFRQVLGHUDEOHREVWDFOHWRUHDOZDJHDGMXVWPHQWV Our estimates indicate 
that wage rigidity is almost complete for full-time workers who stay with the same employer, 
but we find little evidence of nominal rigidities for workers who switch employers. We also 
find evidence that, in the absence of downward nominal rigidity, real wages would indeed be 
quite responsive to unemployment. 
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,QWURGXFWLRQ
One of the core questions of modern macroeconomics is whether and through which channels 
nominal demand shocks affect output and employment. In this context, the inertia of nominal 
wages plays a key role. The extent and the nature of downward nominal wage rigidity are 
likely to have strong implications for the real effects of nominal demand disturbances. In 
recent years there has been a renewed interest in the question of nominal wage rigidity (e.g., 
Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry, 1996; Card and Hyslop 1996, 1996; Kahn 1996; Lebow, 
Stockton, and Washer, 1995; McLaughlin, 1994; Altonji and Devereux, 1999; Smith, 1998), 
and, in particular, whether there are forces that prevent nominal wage cuts. 
Below, we will argue that there are serious reasons – the presence of efficient nominal wage 
contracts, the existence of nominal loss aversion and nominal fairness standards – that may 
prevent firms from implementing nominal pay cuts. Most of the above cited evidence 
indicates that nominal pay cuts are indeed relatively infrequent. In this sense, the evidence is 
consistent with the assertion of nominal wage rigidity. A major counter-argument is, however, 
that the infrequency of nominal pay cuts is due to the fact that nominal per capita GDP growth 
and, hence, average nominal wages were rapidly rising during the periods considered by these 
authors (Gordon, 1996; Mankiw, 1996). At the same time, a considerable fraction of workers 
receives small real wage cuts. If, instead, nominal per capita GDP growth were low for a 
number of consecutive years, nominal pay cuts would be much more frequent and would, 
hence, no longer be viewed as something special. After all, individuals were prepared to take 
real wage cuts in previous years. As a consequence, fairness standards and the reference 
points used to measure losses would adjust so that firms would no longer be reluctant to cut 
nominal pay
1. 
This paper examines whether nominal wage rigidities disappear in an environment of very 
low nominal per capita GDP growth. For our purposes the data sets used in the above-
                                                 
1 This argument is neatly summarised by Gordon (1996, p. 62): "The … attempt to reason from evidence on 
nominal wage rigidity in an environment of rapid SRVLWLYH average nominal wage change to a hypothetical 
situation of ]HUR average nominal wage change is subject to the Lucas critique. If the macroeconomic 
environment were different, microeconomic behavior would be different. Nominal wage reductions would no 
longer be seen as unusual if the average nominal wage was not growing. Workers would not see them as unfair, 
and firms would not shy away from imposing them." See also the recent edition of 7KH(FRQRPLVW (1999), who 
makes the same point.   2 
mentioned papers have the disadvantage that nominal GDP growth per capita was substantial. 
In this paper we take advantage of the low inflation during a period of almost zero real GDP 
growth in Switzerland between 1991 and 1997. Switzerland experienced inflation and growth 
rates close to zero in several consecutive years. Note that both low inflation and low real GDP 
growth provide an ideal environment for the study of the above counter-argument. Low real 
GDP growth implies that average real wage growth is moderate. Inflation rates that are close 
to zero mean that real wage cuts frequently would have to take the form of nominal wage cuts. 
Thus, if fairness standards and reference points indeed adjust to this environment, we should 
find no, or at least evidence of fading, nominal wage rigidity.  
Previous examinations of nominal wage rigidity are based on survey data. Survey data contain 
measurement error which makes the detection of nominal rigidity difficult. Some authors 
(e.g., Akerlof, Dickens and Perry, 1996) have argued that measurement error hides nominal 
rigidity while others (e.g., Smith 1999) claim that measurement error gives rise to spurious 
nominal inertia. In this paper we tackle the issue of measurement error in two ways. First, we 
are in the fortunate position to use two independent data sources that provide information 
about individual wages between 1991 and 1997. One of these data sources is a random sample 
from the Swiss Social Insurance File (SIF), which records all financial transactions between 
workers and their firms. The SIF contains accurate earnings information. Second, our 
econometric analyses take into account the possibility of measurement error explicitly. Based 
on the method developed by Altonji and Devereux (1999) we estimate the amount of 
measurement error in a parametric way. This allows us to separate the effects of nominal 
wage rigidity from the other determinants of real wage changes and from measurement error. 
The method of Altonji and Devereux relies on the intuition that there may be obstacles to 
nominal wage cuts that prevent firms from implementing all desired wage cuts. In particular, 
if the desired wage cut, that is defined as the wage cut that would obtain in the absence of 
downward rigidity, is sufficiently small firms will not implement the cut. We motivate the use 
of this method with evidence from personnel records of two large firms in Switzerland. Wage 
cuts are very rare in these records and there is no tendency towards more wage cuts. 
Our results indicate that this is also the case in the two representative data sources.0RUH
LPSRUWDQWO\WKHUHOXFWDQFHWRFXWQRPLQDOZDJHVLVDUREXVWSKHQRPHQRQ: The fall in inflation 
from roughly 5 percent in 1991 to zero in 1997 is accompanied with a considerable rise in 
downward wage rigidity. According to the conservative estimates from our SIF sample the 
fraction of workers who did not experience nominal cuts due to downwardly rigid wages rose   3 
from 25 percent in 1991 to roughly 60 percent in 1997. For this group of workers the presence 
of nominal rigidity prevented UHDOwage cuts of 6.3 percent in 1991 and of 13.3 percent in 
1997. Thus, if anything, nominal inertia became more important as inflation decreased and 
that the Swiss experience casts doubt on the conjectures of Gordon and Mankiw (1996). We 
believe that this result is important for a further reason. The Swiss labor market is one of the 
least regulated and least unionized labor markets in Europe. In Switzerland employers are 
allowed to renegotiate a contract, e.g. demand a wage cut, with explicit threat of dismissal. 
Unless the worker agrees, the employment relation ends. But this implies that wage rigidities 
due to the presence of efficient nominal contracts cannot be important (Malcomson, 1997).  
The strength and persistence of downward wage rigidity are surprising and point to the 
importance of the underlying behavioral forces. According to our most conservative estimate, 
the desired wage cut must exceed 15 percent to induce firms to actually cut the workers’ 
nominal pay. If the desired wage cut is less, workers receive wage freezes instead. Our least 
conservative estimate indicates, however, that the threshold value for cutting nominal pay is 
36 percent. Moreover, we find significant differences between full-time and part-time 
employees, and little downward rigidity for workers who switch employers. Nominal rigidity 
is more pronounced for full-time workers: At most 3.3 percent receive wage cuts and between 
45 and 60 percent of the full-time workers receive wage freezes instead of cuts. In contrast, 
part-time workers’ wages are more flexible and at least 11 percent receive wage cuts. The 
sizeable differences between job stayers and job movers and between part-time workers and 
full-time workers lend further credibility to our results because, as we argue in more detail 
below, the behavioral forces that give rise to nominal rigidity are likely to be most important 
for full-time stayers.  
We show that in the absence of downward rigidities, real wages would indeed be quite 
flexible in their response to unemployment. High unemployment growth reduces wage growth 
substantially. A one percent growth in the regional unemployment rate lowers wage growth 
by almost one percent, provided that it doesn’t entail a nominal wage cut.  
Since downward wage rigidity has quite large an impact on real wages and the effect is not 
fading at lower rates of inflation, our findings have potentially important implications for 
monetary policy. The estimates are consistent with the view that low inflation imposes 
permanently higher unit labor costs, as less real wage cuts occur, and that full-time 
incumbents are disproportionately affected. This may lead to permanently lower overall 
employment and distortions between full-time and part-time jobs.    4 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses potential reasons for 
the downward rigidity of nominal wages. Section 3 reviews previous studies that used survey 
data similar to our second data source and highlights the advantages of our data sets. Section 4 
provides a description of the empirical pattern of wage changes in Switzerland between 1991 
and 1997 and Section 5 presents the empirical model of wage changes. Section 6 presents the 
results and Section 7 concludes the paper.  
 5HDVRQVIRU1RPLQDO:DJH5LJLGLW\
In a frictionless economy with zero costs of replacing workers and fully optimizing agents 
nominal wage rigidity does not occur. In this economy employers can always credibly 
threaten to replace incumbents who are unwilling to accept nominal pay cuts. However, in the 
presence of legal or economic frictions that cause positive replacement costs there are at least 
three reasons why nominal wage cuts cannot be enforced by the employers or why employers 
are unwilling to enforce them: 
(i)  Employers and workers may have implemented nominal wage contracts that can only 
be changed by mutual consent. 
(ii)  Nominal pay cuts are likely to be experienced as particularly painful for reasons of 
nominal loss aversion. 
(iii)  Nominal pay cuts are likely to violate standards of fairness and are thus interpreted as 
an insult by the employees.  
In the past an important objection against nominal wage contracts has been that they are 
inefficient. However, as has been shown by MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) and, more 
recently, by Holden (1999) nominal wage contracts that can only be changed by mutual 
consent provide efficient protection of general and specific investments in human capital. 
Thus, it may well be in the interest of employers and workers to implement such contracts.
2 
The important implication of these contracts is that the nominal wage will change only if the 
outside option of either the employer or the worker becomes binding at the prevailing wage. 
However, due to the presence of specific human capital, the outside options will frequently 
                                                 
2The arguments in MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) and Holden (1999) apply to non-unionized economies. 
Holden (1994) shows that in a unionized economy, in which production continues under the terms of the old 
contract while the parties are bargaining over a new contract, nominal rigidity arises.    5 
not be binding so that sufficiently small changes in the outside options do not affect the 
nominal wage. Decreases in the value of the marginal product of the worker, in particular, 
may not cause nominal wage decreases. These contracts require if a contract is renegotiated 
and one party does agree to the proposed change in terms, the old contract prevails. 
Switzerland is a notable exception among european countries, because Swiss law allows to 
change the terms of a contract under the explicit threat of dismissal otherwise. As discussed in 
Malcomson (1997), nominal contracts of this kind cannot be sustained in this setting.  
Absent this explanation, there are at least two other explanations why wage cuts are rarely 
observed. The notion of loss aversion as developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) is 
based on the idea that losses and gains relative to a neutral reference point are the "carrier of 
subjective value" that motivates behavior. Loss aversion means that losses are psychologically 
more salient than gains of the same absolute size, i.e. they are experienced as particularly 
painful and are thus likely to trigger different behaviors than, e.g. a reduction in gains. There 
is ample evidence from questionnaire studies and many experimental examinations indicating 
the behavioral relevance of loss aversion (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). Many people 
are willing to take more risks in the domain of losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and 
their financial decisions seem to be affected by loss aversion (Thaler and Tversky, 1996; 
Benartzi and Thaler 1995). Moreover, they make systematically sub-optimal decisions to 
avoid losses in intertemporal choice situations (Fehr and Zych, 1997), their ability to 
coordinate on Pareto-superior equilibria is systematically affected by the desire to avoid 
losses
3 (Cachon and Camerer, 1996) and price formation in competitive experimental markets 
also seems to be significantly influenced by loss aversion (Myagkoff and Plott, 1997).  
In a recent paper, Genesove and Mayer (1998) provide strong evidence for nominal loss 
aversion in housing markets. They show that in a given market situation, i.e., for a given 
expected selling price, those sellers who bought their house at a higher nominal purchase price 
than the prevailing expected selling price ask for substantially higher selling prices than those 
sellers who bought their house below the prevailing expected selling price. Moreover, it turns 
out that sellers who face nominal losses relative to the original purchase price do in fact sell 
                                                 
3 Cachon and Camerer show that in coordination games with multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria, the subtraction of 
a constant number from all payoffs, so that Pareto-inferior equilibria involve losses, enables agents to avoid the 
play of inferior equilibria. Note that the subtraction of a constant from all payoffs leaves the game strategically 
unchanged. The authors show, however, that the play of inferior equilibria FDQQRW be avoided when these 
equilibria do not involve losses.   6 
their houses at higher prices. Interestingly, Genesove and Mayer also find that nominal loss 
aversion is not only exhibited by owner-occupants but also by professional investors in the 
housing market.  
In our view there is no reason why workers should exhibit less nominal loss aversion than 
owner-occupants or investors in the housing market. From a psychological viewpoint, it 
seems rather likely that nominal pay cuts are interpreted as losses. The pain inflicted by these 
losses may well trigger resentments that induce workers to take actions (e.g. shirking or 
quitting) that are costly to the firm. This, in turn, may prevent firms from implementing 
nominal pay reductions.  
Survey and experimental studies indicate that fairness standards are relevant for the behavior 
of employees and employers (e.g. Bewley, 1995, 1999; Blinder and Choi, 1990, Campbell and 
Kamlani, 1997; Fehr and Falk, 1999; Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl, 1993). Virtually all of 
these studies suggest that violations of fairness standards have negative effects on work 
morale and that firms shy away from violating these standards. There is also evidence that 
judgments of fairness and job satisfaction are affected by nominal pay (Kahneman, Knetsch 
and Thaler, 1986; Shafir, Diamond, and Tversky, 1997). This is neatly expressed by the 
president of a large division (32,000 employees) of an insurance company, interviewed by 
Bewley (1999): 
5HDO SD\ FXWV WKURXJK LQIODWLRQ DUH HDVLHU WKDQ QRPLQDO RQHV ,QIODWLRQ LV
JUDGXDO5HDOSD\FXWVJLYHSHRSOHPRUHWLPHWRDGMXVWWKDQDVXGGHQFXWLQ
SD\«1RPLQDOSD\FXWVDUHDQLQVXOWHYHQLIHYHU\ERG\LVFXW
Bewley collected data from 236 managers and human resource officers regarding the 
consequences of pay cuts. He draws a consistent picture of compensation officers unwilling to 
cut nominal wages: 69% agreed that nominal pay cuts hurt morale, 42% feared a direct effect 
on productivity, 41% asserted that it increased turnover, and some 10% feared more drastic 
retaliation from employees such as theft or even sabotage. 
In our view the employees’ resentment in response to the experience of a nominal loss and the 
violation of fairness standards caused by the nominal pay reductions represent plausible forces 
inhibiting such cuts. However, in this context one has to take into account that both the 
definition and, hence, the experience of a loss and the definition of what is fair may shift in 
response to changes in the economic environment. Put differently: In a situation of very low 
average growth of nominal wages, pay cuts may become customary so that they are no longer 
perceived as losses or as a violation of a fairness standard. Therefore, loss aversion and   7 
fairness considerations may no longer inhibit nominal pay cuts. This claim can only be 
examined with data from periods of low average nominal wage growth and that is why the 
Swiss experience since 1991 is of general interest.  
Before we proceed further we would like to point out that the behavioral forces contributing to 
nominal wage rigidity are likely to be different for different categories of workers. For 
example, if it is indeed the case that nominal wage cuts hurt work morale it may be better for 
firms to fire a worker than to cut her nominal wage. It seems very likely that the new 
employer of the fired worker is less constrained by the impact of historically evolving fairness 
standards or by the worker’s employment history. Therefore, it seems much easier to impose 
pay cuts on job movers than on job stayers. A similar argument can be made with regard to 
full-time and part-time workers. It seems likely that full-time workers have more specific 
human capital so that nominal wage contracts are probably more important for them than for 
part-time workers. In addition, for a firm the loyalty and work morale of full-time workers is, 
of course more important than the loyalty and work morale of part-time workers. Moreover, 
the relevance of fairness standards is likely to be more important for workers with a greater 
attachment to the firm. Therefore, firms are likely to be more reluctant to cut the nominal 
wages of full-time workers. Thus, if the behavioral forces discussed above are relevant we 
should observe that nominal inertia differs across these categories of workers.  
 3UHYLRXV6WXGLHV
In this section, we shortly review five recent studies of wage rigidities that use data of 
individual wage changes from panel surveys or directly ask individuals to state the wage 
changes. McLaughlin (1994) presents an early study of wage rigidities in the U.S. He finds 
substantial variability in real wage changes, and concludes that wage changes are not skewed 
away from wage cuts. In his analysis, the frequency of wage cuts is unaffected by inflation.
4  
Yet, other authors’ results deviate considerably from McLaughlin’s study. Kahn (1997) 
mentions that the skewness statistics are dominated by observations far away from the median 
and therefore susceptible to outlier influences. She shows that in a virtually identical data set 
as McLaughlin’s a given real wage change is less likely if it entails a nominal pay cut. She 
                                                 
4 Smith (1999) examines the British experience and argues that most of the observed wage rigidity is essentially 
an artifact of surveys and in fact produced by a very persistent form of measurement error.   8 
finds strong evidence of nominal wage rigidities at the micro level. She does not address the 
issue how nominal rigidities affect real wage flexibility.  
Card and Hyslop (1996) use a different technique to uncover nominal rigidities. They 
construct a counterfactual distribution of wage changes, i.e., a distribution of wage changes in 
the absence of nominal inertia. They find that, in the range of negative nominal wage changes, 
the difference between the counterfactual and the actual density of wage changes becomes 
larger as inflation declines. Hence, more individuals are affected by nominal rigidities at 
lower levels of inflation. Card and Hyslop also test whether low inflation leads to slower 
adjustment of real wages, but find no evidence for this.  
Two studies have dealt explicitly with the fact that survey data may be error-ridden. Akerlof, 
Dickens, and Perry (1996) conduct a telephone survey and directly ask individuals to state 
their wage changes. They then pollute the data with a random distribution that closely 
resembles the distribution of measurement error from validation studies. The distribution they 
obtain shares many features of the distribution of wage changes obtained from labor force 
survey. They conclude that one cannot reject the hypothesis that the true distribution of wage 
changes exhibits total wage rigidity, but that this is masked by measurement error.  
Altonji and Devereux (1999) develop an interesting model that explicitly allows for 
measurement error in a parametric way. We will give a detailed description of this model in 
section 5. They find that once one eliminates measurement error from the data, wages are far 
from flexible. In some specifications, they cannot reject the hypothesis that wages are 
perfectly rigid and there are no true wage cuts. 
All of the above studies have in common that nominal per capita GDP growth was substantial 
over the period considered. The median growth rate of nominal GDP per capita is, for 
example, never below 6.4 percent in these studies (see Table 1). As pointed out in the 
introduction, it is therefore difficult to draw inferences from these studies about the behavior 
of individuals in an environment of low nominal growth. To examine whether nominal inertia 
vanishes or is reduced in an environment of low nominal GDP growth one needs a data set 
that is based on a prolonged period of low nominal growth. This is so because one cannot 
expect that nominal reference points and fairness standards adjust instantaneously to a new 
environment.   
In this study we take advantage of the long recession with low inflation in Switzerland over 
the years 1991 to 1997. Table 1 shows that during this time period the median nominal per 
capita GDP growth is much lower (1.7 percent) than the median growth in the US during the   9 
time periods covered by the above cited studies. In addition, Table 1 reports the maximum 
number of FRQVHFXWLYH years during which nominal per capita GDP growth is below 4 percent 
and below 2 percent. For the time periods covered by the above studies it occasionally 
happened that in a single year nominal per capita GDP growth was below 4 percent. However, 
nominal growth rates below 4 percent never occurred in two or more consecutive years. In 
contrast, in Switzerland nominal growth per capita was below 4 percent during the period 
considered. Moreover, in three consecutive years nominal growth was even below 2 percent.  
 
7KH3DWWHUQRI1RPLQDO:DJH&KDQJHV
We use two different data sets, each with its own features, to evaluate the extent of nominal 
wage rigidities: The Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS) 1991 – 1998 allows us to calculate 
changes in hourly wages for non-self employed individuals. In total, the SLFS provides 
27,238 observations of wage changes, out of which 24,567 observations come from workers 
who stayed with the same employer
5 over at least two consecutive years. The Swiss Labor 
Force Survey is useful for two reasons. It provides extensive information on worker 
characteristics. The characteristics include the usual determinants of wage growth such as 
tenure, labor market experience, education levels, gender, age and nationality. Second, it 
restores comparability with studies that used similar data sets.  
The second source of data is a large random sample from the Social Insurance Files (SIF). All 
financial transactions between firms and workers are recorded in the Social Insurance Files. 
The sample covers essentially the same period of time
6. We obtain a sample of 147,439 
observations of wage changes over the time span. This sample has three advantages. First, 
measurement error is not an issue. The earnings information obtained from the SIF is 
accurate. Second, the sample is comfortably large. Third, since the SIF data covers the same 
period of time as the SLFS, we can replicate the empirical analysis we conduct with the SLFS 
and check whether analyses that used survey data overstated the extent of nominal wage 
rigidities. We should also mention that the SIF data has three problems. First, it is impossible 
                                                 
5 In slight abuse of terminology, we will refer to these as ’job stayers’. We are aware that this term more 
accurately describes employees who stay on the same job assignment with the same employer. 
6 The Social Security Files are December to December data, while the SLFS is conducted in May. Henceforth, 
referring to wage changes in e.g. 1993, we mean wage changes between May 1993 and May 1994 for the SLFS 
and wage changes between December 1992 and December 1993 for the SSF.   10 
to identify job stayers with certainty. We only include workers who were insured by the same 
local social insurance agency in two consecutive years since these are most likely to be job 
stayers. However, if an individual changes the employer, but both employers are associated 
with the same local agency, the individual may still be included in our sample. Thus, we may 
wrongly include job movers in our SIF sample, which could understate the true degree of 
nominal wage rigidity. Second, we have no information on hours worked and salary 
components. Hence, when referring to wage changes in the sample, we should bear in mind 
that we only observe changes in earnings per year. For instance, temporary variations in 
hours, which arise, e.g., through different overtime in two years, look like a ‘wage change' in 
our sample. As we will illustrate below, this can generate a substantial number of false 
negatives in a sample with low average nominal income growth. Third, the worker 
characteristics we observe are not the same as in the SLFS. They include age, nationality, 
gender, details on the agency that recorded the payment and the period of time to which it 
applies.  
Figure 1a summarizes the distribution of nominal wage changes of job stayers in Switzerland 
between 1991 and 1997. Consider first the figure on the left which displays the histogram 
obtained from the SLFS. It exhibits common characteristics for this type of histograms:  
1.  There is a VSLNH DW ]HUR: The largest bin is the one containing no and small, but 
positive nominal wage changes (between zero and 2 percent).
7  
2.  There is an DV\PPHWU\ in the distribution of wage changes. Negative wage changes are 
observed much less frequently than positive wage changes. 
Compare this to the right panel of Figure 1a, which is based on the SIF data using identical 
bins. Two features deserve to be mentioned here: First, the SIF distribution is more centered 
on zero than the SLFS distribution For instance, 45% of all observations in the SLFS are 
between zero and 10 percent, while the corresponding figure is 59% in the SIF. Second, the 
asymmetry is more pronounced in the SIF sample. The pile-up of observations just above zero 
is much heavier and the discontinuity around zero obvious. One possible explanation for the 
lack of centrality and asymmetry in the SLFS is the presence of measurement error.  
Table 2 provides additional information on wage changes in our two data sources together 
with the inflation rate and real per capita GDP growth. The table shows that the sharp 
                                                 
7 For the exact fraction of zero wage changes see Table 2.   11 
decrease in the rate of inflation at the beginning of the period considered is associated with 
more observed wage cuts in the labor force survey and more zero wage changes. However, the 
fraction of observed wage cuts is almost always smaller in the SIF sample and the same holds 
for the fraction of zero wage changes. This again suggests that measurement error is important 
in the labor force survey: Imagine that the distribution of true wage changes has no, or only 
few, negative entries. Assume further that measurement error is important. Then, as the 
distribution moves closer to zero over time, measurement error creates a larger number of 
negative observations. Therefore, we measure more wage cuts in the SLFS sample. Note that 
the fact that we cannot control for hours variation in the SIF sample only strengthens this 
argument because it is likely to produce false negatives in this sample, a point to which we 
return below. 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the distribution of wage changes over time, using the SIF 
sample. The sequence of distributions conveys the impression that the decline in inflation is 
associated with a rise in downwards rigidity. Consider, first, the three panels for 1991, 1992, 
and 1993. In these years the distribution is (locally) symmetric around its median. The bins to 
the left and the right of the median are of similar size. Compare this to the distribution of 
wage changes in the low inflation years 1995 to 1997, where the median is much closer to 
zero. Now compare the bins to the left and right. The distribution is squished at zero and 
exhibits a pronounced asymmetry around it. However, there is only a relatively small increase 
in the frequency of negative wage changes, while the cluster to the right of zero is getting 
much larger.  
To summarize the above discussion, we claim the following: 
1.  Measurement error in the SLFS is important and FRQWULEXWHVWRXQGHUVWDWLQJ the true 
extent of downward nominal rigidity. 
2.  Although we observe many earnings decreases in the SIF, these most likely reflect 
temporary variations in hours and QRWWUXHZDJH FXWV 
The validity of these claims is essential to the empirical approach that we discuss below. We 
obtained personnel records from two large firms in Switzerland to corrobate further evidence 
for the two claims. Firm A is a large firm in the service industry with approximately 10,000 
employees. The personnel records go from 1993 to 1999. Average wage growth in Firm A 
was 3.8 % (standard deviation: 5.3 percent). Firm B is a medium size firm that is in the 
service industry and has a (declining) branch in manufacturing. The records start in 1984 and   12 
end in 1999. Employment per year drops from about 2000 in 1990 to 1000 in 1998, from 
where it started to rise again
8. Wages grew on average by 5.7 % (standard deviation: 5 %).  
Figure 1b displays the distribution of wage changes in the two firms, where we chose the ;-
scale to preserve comparability with figure 1a. There are two striking features in figure 1b. 
First and foremost, there are YHU\IHZZDJHFXWV. In Firm A (N=35,779), only 1.7 % of all 
observations are wage cuts. In Firm B (N=20,236), the fraction is even lower (.4 %). Both 
distributions exhibit a discontinuity at zero that could hardly be more pronounced and need 
not be discussed any further. Second, the distribution of wage changes in both firms is much 
more centered than those in the companion figure 1a. While in both firms, 89 % of all 
observations are between zero and 10 percent, the same statistic is only 59 % for the SIF and 
45 % for the SLFS. Both facts are consistent with the first claim. Adding a (symmetric) 
random disturbance calibrated to match the distribution of measurement error, as e.g. in 
Bound and Krueger (1991), to any of the two histograms would create false negatives and 
make the distribution less centered. In short, it would produce a figure much like the 
histogram of wage changes from the SLFS.  
We provide evidence for the second claim in figure 3. The first panel reproduces the 
distribution of wage changes in Firm B, but only for the period 1993 to 1998. We constrain 
the sample, because information on overtime payments are only available over this period of 
time. In the second panel, we intentionally inject these overtime payments into the salaries to 
calculate ’polluted’ wage changes as we would observe them in the SIF, other things being 
equal. The distribution of ’wage’ changes in the second panel now contains a sizeable fraction 
of negatives (8 %) and is less centered than the true distribution around zero. The fraction of 
observations between zero and 10 percent declines to 77 %. While this does not replicate the 
moments of the SIF sample perfectly, it goes long way and presents evidence for the second 
claim. Keep in mind that average salary growth is high in firm B, hence any random 
disturbance that we add would generate more negatives in a low-growth firm.  
                                                 
8 The reason is that Firm B closed its manufacturing plants, which was accompanied with a large employment 
decrease, many of which were dismissals.   13 
$Q(PSLULFDO0RGHORI:DJH&KDQJHV
The previous discussion added to the plausibility of our two claims and the subsequent 
treatment of these features. Thus, measurement error can generate wage decreases in the SLFS 
data. Likewise, unobserved variation in working hours could be the source of the increased 
frequency of negative earnings changes in our SIF data. However, the raw observations in 
Table 2 could also represent true wage cuts per working time unit. Therefore, we need an 
econometric model that allows explicitly for the presence of measurement error so that one 
can separate true wage changes from wage changes that merely reflect measurement error. 
The method developed by Altonji and Devereux (1999) delivers exactly this product.  
The general idea behind this method is the following: Due to the reasons outlined in section 2 
nominal wage cuts are perceived as costly by the firms. Therefore, firms will not implement 
all desired wage cuts, i.e., there will be a difference between the desired or “notional” wage 
cuts and actually implemented wage cuts. However, the larger the desired wage cut the more 
likely it is that the benefits will outweigh the costs. Hence, there may exist a critical value a, 
below which the firm will be unwilling to cut the wage but above which the benefits outweigh 
the costs. Our main focus is on estimating this parameter. Nominal inertia may, however, not 
only prevent wage cuts. It may also reduce the wage cut relative to the desired cut. The model 
below also allows for this possibility. To achieve our goals, we need a complete model of 
wage changes that also incorporates the determinants of wages in the absence of rigidities and 
allows for unobserved variation in the data. We can then estimate all the parameters of interest 
jointly. 
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where  LW \ D  is the REVHUYHG log wage change of individual L in period W,  LW LW H E [ + ’  is the 
GHVLUHG wage change that would be implemented in the absence of downwards nominal wage 
rigidity,  LW [  is a set of observable variables,  LW H  represents unobserved change in productivity, 
and  LW P  is unobserved variation in the data, which will be measurement error in the SLFS and 
temporary hours in the SIF. l measures the extent to which wage cuts, if implemented, are 
constrained. As modeled above, l is simply a constant reduction of the wage cut relative to   14 
the desired cut. In the absence of nominal inertia and measurement error the determinants of 
wage changes are solely given by  LW [ . In our empirical estimates below  LW [  contains variables 
like labor market experience, age, tenure and observable skills of worker L. In addition, we 
included the firm size, the change in the regional unemployment rate, year dummies and a 
dummy that captures the foreigner status of L. However, if nominal inertia and measurement 
error are potentially important, the empirical model must take this into account. Therefore, 
observed wage changes can fall into one of the following three regimes: 
(i) If the desired nominal wage change is positive there are no forces that inhibit this wage 
change, i. e., we observe  ’ LW LW LW [EH P ++ in the data and the likelihood of this occurring is 
(’ | ’ 0 ) H P LW LW LW LW I \ [E [EH + D- + > 
where ( ) HP I + ×  is the density of the sum of H and P.  
(ii) If  ’ [EH +  falls between zero and  a - , the firm will not cut the worker’s wage but give 
him a pay freeze instead. The observed ‘wage change' is then entirely due to unobserved 
variation. Hence the likelihood of falling in this regime only depends on the distribution of P 
and is given by 
(’ |’ 0 ) PL WL W L W L W I \ [E [EH a D- - < +< 
(iii) If the desired wage cut is larger than a , the firm will implement the wage cut although 
the size of the cut may be smaller than desired. The conditional density for this event is 
(’ | ’ ) H P LW LW LW LW I\ [ E[ E H la + D- - +< - 
Since it cannot be observed which regime generated a particular observation, the likelihood of 
an observation sums up to  
( ’ | ’ 0) Pr( ’ 0)
( ’ | ’ 0) Pr( ’ 0)
(’ | ’ ) P r ( ’ )
LW H P LW LW LW LW LW LW
P L W L W L WL W L WL W
H P LW LW LW LW LW LW
OI \ [ E [ E H [ E H
I \ [E [EH [EH
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   (2) 
We assume that H and P are i.i.d. normal and estimate the parameters by maximum likelihood. 
In the appendix, where we derive (2) rigorously, we also show that in this case, the 
conditional densities involving  ) (× +P H I  take a particularly simple form, whereas they are 
rather complex in the general case.   15 
One feature of this approach is that it nests both extreme cases, i.e., the cases of perfect wage 
flexibility and of perfect wage rigidity. As  0 ® a  there is no wage rigidity. In this case the 
model collapses to a simple OLS regression of  LW \ D  where only the sum of H and P is 
identified. If, at the other extreme,  ¥ ® a , there are no true wage cuts and the third regime 
drops out. Hence, the model nests both extreme cases, and any intermediate one. We would 
like to emphasize that the above model does not assume that observed wage cuts merely 
represent measurement error (or variation in hours). Instead, it provides joint estimates of the 
threshold value a  and the variance of the distribution of measurement errors. If we estimate 
ana  that is close to zero most observed wage cuts represent true wage cuts. However, if we 
estimate large values of a  many observed wage cuts will be lower than a  and, hence, the 
extent of measurement error is bigger.  
A second feature is that we can estimate the determinants of a . Instead of imposing the 
restriction (as in equation (1)) that a  is the same for all workers in all years we can allow for 
year-specific  a ’s or for different a ’s for different groups of workers. In particular, by 
estimating year-specific a ’s we can observe whether a  is lower in low-inflation years that 
provide direct evidence for the validity of the conjecture put forward by Gordon and Mankiw 
(1996). Finally, by allowing variations of a across different categories of workers we can also 
examine, e.g., whether a  is different for full-time and part-time workers or for job stayers 
and job movers.  
 
5HVXOWV
In this section, we discuss the results obtained by estimating the previously outlined model. 
We first present the overall tests for the presence of downward nominal wage rigidity. We 
then evaluate the stability of these estimates as inflation gets very low. Finally, we assess the 
implications of the model for different types of workers and the extent to which downward 
wage rigidity prevents real wage cuts. 
We estimate the basic model (1) in two versions. In the ‘continuous' model, we assume that 
the unobserved variation in the data is normally distributed. That is, everybody makes 
mistakes when reporting earnings to a labor force survey, and everybody's hours vary. In the 
‘mixed' model we allow for the case that, in every year, a fraction S (that will be estimated) of 
all individuals has no unobserved variation, but that the rest of the sample draws a normally 
distributed error. This amounts to saying that in the SLFS, a fraction Sof all respondents   16 
states the correct income, but the rest makes normally distributed errors. In analogy, in the SIF 
sample, a fraction S of all individuals has no variation in hours in that particular year.  
The key difference between the continuous and the mixed model is the way the observations 
with 0 = D LW \  are treated. A realization of zero has probability zero in a normal distribution. 
Hence, the mixed model treats all observations with an observed wage freeze as unaffected by 
the distribution of P and, hence, does not use them to estimate its parameters.  
The mixed model is appropriate for the SIF sample since we know from several other data 
sources (e.g. the SLFS) that many people did not work overtime during the previous year. 
Thus, for a fraction of the people in the SIF sample an observed earnings change of zero 
represents a true wage freeze. However, the mixed model is more problematic to use with the 
SLFS, if rounding by respondents causes many of the observations with a zero wage change, 
as claimed e.g. in Smith (1999). The mixed model will treat these observations as true wage 
freezes, whereas they could also be small wage increases which are subject to a rounding 
error. Hence, the mixed model will tend to overstate the extent of nominal rigidities if 
rounding is a serious problem. This is not the case in the continuous model, which treats all 
observations around zero alike. If rounding is symmetric, the continuous model will not be 
biased in any particular direction. Hence, by comparing the estimates across both methods and 
both data sets, we gain insights on how important rounding errors are and by how much they 
affect our conclusions. 
$UH:DJHV)OH[LEOH"
The basic results for both samples and models are displayed in Table 3. Consider first the 
estimates from the SLFS. We find strong evidence for nominal wage rigidities in both, the 
continuous and mixed model specifications. a is large and estimated with a tiny standard 
error. In both models, the drop in productivity must be substantially larger than 20 percent in 
order to induce the firm to cut its employee’s wage.  
The underlying wage growth function displays substantial wage flexibility if wage setting is 
not constrained by downward rigidity. We find a declining experience profile for wage 
growth. In order to avoid awkward polynomials we only include log experience to capture the 
curvature. The estimated coefficient is negative and highly significant. Increasing labor 
market experience from one to ten years decreases wage growth by 2.1 percent. We also find 
evidence for a wage curve, but one that allows for nominal rigidities. The estimated 
coefficient on the change in regional unemployment is also significant. It suggests that if   17 
regional unemployment rises from two to four percent, as it frequently happened over the 
course of one year during our sample period, wage growth is reduced by 1.6 percent. Our 
result differs from the ‘classical' wage curve found by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) in an 
important respect. Our model suggests that unemployment has a strong effect on wages, but 
only in years where average wage growth is high enough. Unemployment growth reduces 
wage growth only if it doesn't require a nominal pay cut. Hence, wages would indeed be quite 
flexible in the absence of nominal wage rigidities. 
The extent of measurement error in our survey data is substantial although it is lower than 
expected. Our estimate of the standard deviation of the measurement error in the sample ( P s ) 
is roughly 7 percent. This is quite low compared to what validation studies of labor force 
surveys found (see, e.g., Angrist and Krueger (1999)). The standard errors obtained from 
validation studies are never below 10 percent, and sometimes considerably larger.  
Notice also that the two different specifications of the measurement error do not alter the 
qualitative conclusions with respect to the extent of nominal wage rigidities. Previous studies 
(McLaughlin, 1994; Smith, 1999) have argued that the apparent rigidity of wages is largely 
due to rounding by individuals. We find little evidence for this claim. The estimated a  is 23.4 
and 28.1 for the continuous and the mixed model, respectively. The difference is less than five 
percentage points. This is compatible with the view that rounding may have some effect but 
that this effect is small relative to the overall extent of nominal rigidity. Finally, we find 
evidence that if firms cut wages, they do not go all the way. The point estimate of l suggests 
that if a wage cut occurs, it is lower than the actual productivity drop.  
If we turn to the estimates obtained from the SIF sample, which are reported in the third and 
fourth column of table 3, we find again a large and highly significant a . The point estimates 
range from 0.15 for the continuous model to 0.2 for the mixed model where we included l. 
All models reject both, perfect flexibility and perfect rigidity. Notice also that the effects of 
unemployment on wages are very similar to the SFLS sample. Again, the point estimate of the 
coefficient on the (percentage point) change in regional unemployment is negative and highly 
significant. It implies that, in the absence of nominal wage rigidities, a rise in the 
unemployment rate from two to four percent would reduce wage growth by 1.8 percent. This 
supports our previous conclusion based on the survey data that nominal wages would be quite 
flexible and responsive to unemployment in the absence of nominal wage rigidities.  
Unobserved variation in hours have a standard deviation of just a bit less than 4 percent, 
which seems plausible. As with the SLFS, the estimated a  is larger in the mixed model than   18 
in the continuous model, but the difference is not large. This time, however, rounding error in 
the data is not an issue, and the estimates of the mixed model can be taken at face value. 
At a first glance, the different estimates of a ’s across the two data sets seem to imply that 
there may be substantial differences in the estimated extent of nominal wage rigidity. This is 
not true, however, because the implied probability of a wage cut depends on the magnitude of 
a  relative to the standard deviation of wage growth s￿H. The two data sets also produce fairly 
different estimates of s￿H
 9. Since s￿H is larger in the SFLS sample the higher threshold a  need 
not imply that there will be much fewer true wage cuts in this sample. If we examine the 
frequency of true wage cuts that are implied by our estimates (see Table 3) we observe that 
these frequencies are quite similar across samples. While the SIF data predicts slightly more 
wage cuts, the difference to the SLFS is never more than 1.5 percentage points.  
Taken together, Table 3 provides strong evidence for nominal wage rigidities over the whole 
sample period, using two independent data sources. It takes a substantial drop in productivity, 
around 20 percent, to induce firms to cut a worker’s nominal pay. These results closely 
parallel those obtained by Altonji & Devereux (1999) for the U.S.  
$UH1RPLQDO5LJLGLWLHVHDVLO\PDOOHDEOH"
Recall the conjecture put forward by Gordon (1996) that nominal wage rigidities will tend to 
vanish in an environment with low inflation and low GDP growth. The macroeconomic 
environment in Switzerland between 1991 and 1997 allows us to evaluate this claim 
explicitly. The most convenient way to do this is to estimate a year-specific a  and to plot it 
together with the inflation rate over the years. This is done in Figure 4. It is obvious from both 
the SLFS and the SIF that a is not positively correlated with the inflation rate. In fact, the 
point estimates of a  are increasing over time while inflation
10 is decreasing.  
Note that a weakening of nominal rigidities could take two forms. First, a  could decline as 
employees’ fairness standards may adjust to the new nominal environment. Second, a 
somewhat weaker form of the conjecture predicts a higher dispersion among individuals, 
potentially leaving the average a  unaffected. The idea here is that perhaps not all individuals 
                                                 
9 The reason for this may be that our model does not pick up all the measurement error in the SFLS sample 
which could inflate the estimate of sH.  
10 Recall that the SLFS is May-to-May data. Hence, we use May-to-May changes in the CPI measure inflation. 
Analogously, we use December-to-December CPI changes whenever we use the SSF data.   19 
will adjust their reference points, but a significant fraction will. This would lead to different 
a ’s across individuals and would be reflected in a higher standard error in the estimated a . A 
statistical test of the second conjecture is provided in Table 3. The estimates show that the 
increase over time is statistically significant. We can reject individual and joint zero 
restrictions on all year effects relative to the first year in the sample (1991). The estimates also 
show that the precision of the estimate is not declining. In both samples there is no increase in 
the standard errors.  
A further measure of the extent of downward wage rigidity is the fraction of workers who 
actually do not receive wage cuts although – in the absence of nominal inertia – firms would 
cut their wages. Figure 5 plots the fraction of workers affected by nominal rigidity together 
with the estimated frequency of actual wage cuts. Irrespective of the data source, we get the 
same picture: There is essentially no or only a minor increase in the frequency of true wage 
cuts as inflation goes from five to zero percent and real GDP is roughly constant. Instead, the 
fraction of workers affected by nominal wage rigidities rises sharply in both samples. Thus, if 
anything, low inflation exacerbates the extent of downward rigidities. 
:KRLVPRVWDIIHFWHG"
As explained in section 2, there are reasons suggesting that wage rigidity is more important 
among job stayers than among job movers, and more important for full-time stayers compared 
to part-time stayers. In order to test for these differences, we estimate separate values of a  for 
these groups of workers.  
The results regarding the differences between full-time and part time job stayers are displayed 
in Table 5. We find large differences between the two groups of employees. For part-time job 
stayers, the estimated a  is between 20.5 and 23.1 percent, depending on the specification of 
measurement error. A comparison of the estimates for full-time and part-time stayers indicates 
that a much higher productivity drop is needed to induce firms to cut the wages of full-time 
stayers. The point estimate for full-time stayers is above 35 percent in both specifications, and 
the difference to the part-time stayers is significant. This difference is also reflected in the 
estimated frequency of wage cuts. Both models predict that wage cuts almost never occur for 
full-time job stayers. The frequency is below two percent in both specifications. We also see 
that wage cuts are more frequent for part-time job stayers: the point estimate is between 12 
and 13 percent. Despite the higher frequency of wage cuts among part-time stayers this group 
is also strongly affected by downward rigidity. As Table 5 shows roughly 50 percent of the 
part-time stayers did not get wage cuts due to nominal rigidity.    20 
The estimates in Table 5 are based on observations about job stayers only. In a further step 
we, therefore, add job movers to the sample to evaluate whether nominal rigidities are 
confined to job stayers only. Since we are also interested in the impact of different reasons for 
movements between jobs several waves of the SLFS cannot be used because the relevant 
information is only contained in the last three waves. Therefore our sample shrinks to 10,708 
observations. Our estimates regarding the differences between movers and stayers are 
presented in Table 6.  
Overall, job movers are much more likely to experience a wage cut than job stayers. While the 
threshold value for wage cuts is between 30 and 40 percent for full-time stayers it is slightly 
above 10 percent for job movers. Moreover, while at most 3.3 percent of the full-time stayers 
experience wage cuts the frequency of estimated wage cuts is much higher for job movers. 
Between 8 (in the mixed model) and 13 percent (in the continuous model) of those job movers 
who quit their job voluntarily experience wage cuts. Dismissed job movers have to accept 
wage cuts even more frequently. Between 16.6 and 18.1 percent of them experience wage 
cuts. It is also interesting to see that the wages of part-time stayers are cut much more 
frequently than the wages of full time stayers. Approximately between 11 and 14 percent of 
part-time stayers have to accept wage cuts. A final observation is that the difference between 
full-time and part-time workers, which is rather big for job stayers, disappears for job movers. 
For job movers it does not matter whether they work part-time or full-time because the fact 
that they move between jobs is already associated with much more flexible wages.  
 
(IIHFWVRQUHDOZDJHV
Finally, we are interested to what extent the presence of nominal inertia prevented UHDO wage 
decreases of those workers who would have experienced wage cuts in the absence of forces 
inhibiting the cuts. The real wage impact of nominal rigidities is depicted in Figure 6. The 
figure shows that at the beginning of the time period considered, i.e. when inflation was 
roughly 4 percent nominal inertia prevented a real wage decrease of 6.3 percent among full-
time stayers while in 1997 when inflation was zero the prevented real wage decrease of full-
time stayers was pushed up to 13.3 percent. For part-time stayers we observe a similar time 
trend. Nominal inertia prevented a real wage cut of 4 percent in 1991 and of 9.5 percent in 
1997. When discussing the aggregate consequences of nominal wage rigidity one has to 
combine these figures with the fraction of workers that is affected by nominal inertia. Recall 
from figure 5 that the fraction of workers that is affected by downward rigidity is also much   21 
larger in 1997 than in 1991. For example, in the SLFS sample 45 percent of the full-time 
stayers were affected by nominal inertia in 1991 whereas in 1997 66 percent of full-time 
stayers would have experienced wage cuts in the absence of downward rigidity. Thus, the 
impact on the real wages of those affected by nominal inertia and the large increase in the 




The argument that nominal inertia vanishes during a relatively long period of low nominal per 
capita GDP growth is strongly rejected by our data. Our results do not lend support to the 
conjecture that the forces that contribute to nominal inertia are easily malleable by the 
macroeconomic environment. These results are based on two unique data sets that both cover 
the period between 1991 and 1997 in Switzerland, where inflation was below 1 percent during 
four of the seven years and real per capita GDP fluctuated between -.8 and +.5 during the first 
six years. 
We use an approach that allows us to take unobserved variation in the data explicitly into 
account. Although observed wage cuts become more frequent in a low nominal growth 
environment, this is largely due to measurement error. We find no evidence that firms become 
less reluctant to cut nominal wages. According to our most conservative estimate, the required 
productivity drop is, RQ DYHUDJH, 15 percent to induce firms to cut nominal wages. For 
incumbent workers who work full-time the required productivity drop is even above 30 
percent. If productivity falls by less firms, instead, prefer to leave nominal wages unchanged. 
If anything, the necessary productivity drop becomes larger if inflation decreases.  
We find that the wages of full-time job stayers are much more rigid than those of part-time job 
stayers. In addition, we found little evidence for nominal rigidity among worker who switch 
employers. We also show that wages would indeed respond strongly to unemployment, if 
wage setting were not constrained by nominal rigidities. There is a negative and significant 
impact of changes in regional unemployment rates on wage growth. A percentage point 
increase in unemployment decreases incumbents’ wage growth by approximately 0.8 percent. 
This implies that real wages would exhibit substantial flexibility if only nominal rigidities 
were absent.   22 
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TABLE 1: NOMINAL GDP PER CAPITA GROWTH DURING THE SAMPLE YEARS 
 
 










4 PERCENT  2 PERCENT 
        
A. PREVIOUS STUDIES (UNITED STATES)        
Card and Hyslop (1996)  1976 – 1991  7.19% 0  0 
McLaughlin (1994)  1976 – 1986  9.59% 0  0 
Kahn (1997)  1971 – 1988  7.28% 0  0 
Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996)  1959 – 1995  6.47% 1  0 
Altonji and Devereux (1999) 
 
1972 – 1992  6.92% 0  0 
B. THIS STUDY (SWITZERLAND) 
 
1991 – 1997  1.7% All  Years  3 
Sources: Economic Report of the President, 1998. Bureau of the Census; Federal Office of 
Statistics; own calculations 
  
TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF FREEZES AND CUTS  
ACCORDING TO TWO SOURCES, 1991 – 1997 
 
 
      
SOURCE: SWISS LABOR FORCE SURVEY 
 
 


























             
1991  4.7%  -0.8% 0.080  0.172  3,356 0.02 0.12  19,317 
             
1992  3.7%  -0.1% 0.123  0.245  3,813 0.02 0.15  21,172 
             
1993  1.1%  -0.5% 0.135  0.278  4,011 0.03 0.21  21,949 
             
1994  1.6%  0.5% 0.075  0.262  4,089 0.05 0.22  21,741 
             
1995  0.9%  0.6% 0.092  0.247  3,082 0.04 0.25  20,579 
             
1996 
 
0.6%  0% 0.205  0.321  3,213 0.04 0.26  21,224 
1997 
 
-0.02%  1.7% 0.217  0.279  3,398 0.09 0.31  21,457 
Sources: Federal Office of Statistics, Swiss Labour Force Survey 1991 – 1998, Social Security Files Sample 1990 - 1997; own calculations  
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-.009** -.012** -.131** -  -  -  Log Experience 
(.001) 
 
(.002) (.02)       
-.004** -.005** -.006** -  -  -  Log Tenure 
(.002) 
 
(.002) (.002)      
- - - -.067**  -.072**  -.077**  Log Age 
   (.004) 
 
(.002) (.002) 
-.006* -.007* -.008* -.007**  -.008**  -.009**  Change in regional 
Unemployment Rate 
 
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
- - - -.05**  -.05**  -.054**  Foreigner (dummy 
variable) 
 
   (.015)  (.016)  (.017) 
- - - .011**  .012**  .012**  Foreigner*Log(Age) 
     (.004) 
 
(.004) (.005) 
.136 .135 .165 .099 .1  .111  sH
      
sP 
 
.071 .075 .07  .039 .037 .035 
S

-  .379 .363 -  .333 .321 
l

- - .12** 
(.01) 
 





























































































Source: Swiss Labor Force Survey 1991 - 1998, Social Security Files 1990 – 1997; own 
calculations 
Notes: standard errors in parenthesis. *, ** denotes significance at the 5 percent and 1 percent 
level respectively  



























Changes relative to 1991: 
 
  



























sP  .069 .036 
 











    
Notes:    a. standard errors in parenthesis. *, ** denotes significance at the 5 percent and 
1 percent level respectively. b. Same wage growth function as in table 1. Both specifications include    
  l.  
TABLE 5: NOMINAL RIGIDITIES FOR DIFFERENT GROUPS OF WORKERS   









7KUHVKROG:DJH&XW   
   








)UHTXHQF\RI:DJH&XWV   
    
Full-Time Job Stayer  .014  .019 
    
Part-time Job Stayer  .122  .134 




   
Full-Time Job Stayer  .598  .634 
    
Part-time Job Stayer  .475  .511 
    
   
l - .04** 
  (.001) 
 
.142 0.145  sH 
    
sP  .074 0.075 
 











   
Notes:    a. standard errors in parenthesis. *, ** denotes significance at the 5 percent and 
1 percent level respectively. 
b. Same wage growth function as in table 1.  
TABLE 6: NOMINAL RIGIDITIES FOR MOVERS AND STAYERS 
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-RE6WD\HUV   








-RE0RYHUV   


















    
)UHTXHQF\RI:DJH&XWV   
    
-RE6WD\HUV   
Full-time  .033   .01  
    
Part-time  .139   .114  
   
-RE0RYHUV   
Job quits   .129   .081  
    
Dismissals .181  .166   
    
Other reasons  .144   .134  
    
   
.141 .144  sH 
    sP  .074 
 
.079 
3 - .334 
 











   
Notes:    a. standard errors in parenthesis. *, ** denotes significance at the 5 percent and 
1 percent level respectively. 
b. Same wage growth function as in table 1, but data is available only for 1995, 









Figure 1a: Four Views on Nominal Wage Changes
Switzerland 1990 - 1997
Source: Swiss Labor Force Survey





Source: Social Insurance Files








Figure 1b: Four Views on Nominal Wage Changes
Two Large Firms, Switzerland 1993/1984 - 1998
Source: Personnel Files, Firm A





Source: Personnel Files, Firm B








Figure 2: Distribution of Changes in Earnings by Year
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Figure 3: The distribution of wage changes and and overtim
True and ’Polluted’ Wage Changes, Firm B, 1993 - 1998
True Hourly Wage Changes




Wage Changes with variation in overtime


































































































Figure 6: By how much did Nominal Rigidities hold up real wages? 41 Dsshqgl{= Wkh Olnholkrrg Ixqfwlrq
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zkhuh xE lv wkh fxpxodwlyh glvwulexwlrq ixqfwlrq ri wkh vwdqgdug qrupdo
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8zkhuh E lv wkh vwdqgdug qrupdo ghqvlw| ixqfwlrq1 Wkh olnholkrrg iru uhjlph 4
gluhfwo| iroorzv iurp wklv h{suhvvlrq1 Lw lv qrz hdv| wr ghulyh wkh olnholkrrg iru
uhjlph 61 Vlqfh
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